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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
ADVERSE USE. The plaintiff’s land was separated
from the defendant’s land by a road but the plaintiff’s land
actually extended several feet onto the defendant’s side of
the road. The defendant had built a driveway across the
disputed land to the road, maintained a shed on the disputed
land, and grew crops on the disputed land as close as
possible to the road. The plaintiff argued that the
defendant’s use of the land was permissive; therefore, no
adverse possession could occur. The court held that
permission was not supported by the evidence because the
plaintiffs never objected to the defendant’s predecessors in
title use of the disputed land and the plaintiff had asked the
defendant for permission to use the shed on the disputed
land. The court held that the defendant's construction of the
driveway, mowing and growing of crops were sufficient use
of the disputed land to support acquisition of the land by
adverse possession. Sierens v. Frankenreider, 632 N.E.2d
1055 (Ill. Ct. App. 1994).
The plaintiff had cleared timber from the defendant’s
property and filed suit to quiet title by adverse possession to
the area where the trees were cut. The plaintiff claimed to
have built a fence around the area, cleared the area, built a
shed on the property, maintained a garden and constructed a
pond. Expert witnesses, however, testified that aerial
photographs did not indicate any activity on the disputed
land until the timber cutting operation began. The court held
that the trial court’s decision for the defendant was
supported by the evidence. In addition, the trial court’s
failure to award damages for the cut trees was also upheld
because the defendant failed to show how many trees were
cut. Phillips v. Fisher, 634 So.2d 1305 (La. Ct. App.
1994).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
DISCHARGE. The debtors operated a dairy farm and
filed for Chapter 7. The debtors had leased cows and calves
from the creditor and had entered into a purchase contract
for cows and calves in which the creditor retained a security
interest until the contract payments were made. The
debtor/husband sold most of the leased and contract animals
without the permission of the creditor and without remitting
the proceeds to the creditor or making the lease or contract
payments. The debtor/wife did not participate in the sale of
the animals but was found to have participated in the dairy
as a partner with the debtor/husband. The court held that the
debtor/husband’s sale of the leased and contract animals
was a willful and malicious injury of the creditor's rights in
the property; therefore, the creditor’s claim for the rent and
contract price was nondischargeable under Section
523(a)(6). The claim was also held nondischargeable as to
the debtor/wife because the wife was a partner in the
business. In re Bullington, 167 B.R. 157 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1994).
EXEMPTIONS
CATTLE. The debtor dairy farmer claimed three bulls as
exempt tools of the trade under Vt. Stat. § 2740(2). In
denying the exemption, the Bankruptcy Court distinguished
the Vermont exemption as much narrower than the
exemption statutes involved in the cases which allowed such
an exemption. The court also noted that an exemption for
cattle was otherwise provided; thus, indicating that cattle
were not intended by the legislature to be exempt as tools of
the trade. The appellate court reversed, citing precedent
from other circuits that farm animals can qualify as tools of
the trade for farmers. The appellate court noted that other
tools of the trade were also eligible for other specific
exemptions, e.g., trucks were tools of a trade and eligible for
the motor vehicle exemption. The court also noted that the
value limitation on exempt tools of a trade would prevent
abuse by debtors and limit the detrimental effect on
creditors. In re Parrotte, 22 F.3d 472 (2d Cir. 1994), rev’g
unrep. D. Ct. dec. aff’g , 143 B.R. 622 (Bankr. D. Vt.
1992).
LIFE INSURANCE. The debtor claimed an exemption
for the proceeds of a life insurance policy in an access
account established on the pre-petition death of the debtor’s
spouse. The trustee argued that the exemption was available
only as to unmatured policies and that once the proceeds
were paid, the money no longer qualified as an insurance
policy. The court held that the exemption covered the
proceeds of the insurance policy access account established
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pre-petition, including interest earned on that account. The
court also allowed an exemption for the cash surrender
value of insurance policies owned by the debtor on the
debtor’s life. In re Young, 166 B.R. 854 (Bankr. E.D. Tex.
1994).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
PLAN . The debtor's Chapter 12 plan provided that
unsecured creditors would receive payments from projected
income of the debtor during the plan, but also provided that
the projected income would be zero. The debtor sought
discharge after making all payments under the plan but the
trustee objected, claiming that the debtor had failed to pay
all net disposable income to the unsecured creditors. The
debtor argued that, because the plan provided for no
projected income, the debtor was relieved of the
requirement to pay any disposable income. The court held
that the payment of disposable income requirement was
triggered by objections of unsecured creditors during the
confirmation process. Therefore, the plan was confirmed
because the debtor's plan provided for payment of such
income during the plan and the debtor could not negate that
requirement by claiming that in the plan no such income
was projected. In re Rowley, 22 F.3d 190 (8th Cir. 1994),
aff’g unrep. D. Ct. dec.  aff’g, 143 B.R. 547 (Bankr. D.
S.D. 1992).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
AUTOMATIC STAY. The debtor was a vice-president
of a corporation which had failed to pay federal employment
taxes and the IRS had filed a claim in the debtor’s Chapter
13 case for the 100 percent penalty against the debtor as a
responsible person in the corporation. The IRS had assessed
the same penalty against the corporation’s president who
was not a debtor in the case. The IRS sought relief from the
automatic stay to litigate the debtor’s and president’s
liability for the employment taxes, arguing that a single trial
on the issue would be more efficient. The court held that
relief from the automatic stay would not be granted because
a separate trial outside of bankruptcy would deplete the
bankruptcy estate; thus, the hardship of the separate trial
would fall more heavily on the debtor than two trials would
harm the IRS. In re Robinson, 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
¶ 50,326 (E.D. Va. 1994).
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS . The debtor was a
corporation owned by one shareholder. The shareholder was
also a shareholder in another corporation which operated a
similar business in another city but had ceased business. The
assets of the defunct corporation were transferred to the
debtor corporation for no consideration. Within one year
before the bankruptcy petition was filed, the debtor paid the
employment taxes owed by the defunct corporation. The
trustee sought to recover the tax payment under Section
548(a)(2) as a payment made when the debtor was
insolvent. The court held that insufficient evidence was
available to determine whether the debtor was insolvent at
the time of or as a result of the tax payment to grant
summary judgment. The court also held that, under Section
502(d), if the tax payment is determined to be avoidable, the
claims of the IRS in the case would be enjoinable until the
tax payment was repaid to the trustee. In re Larry’s
Marineland of Richmond, Inc., 166 B.R. 871 (Bankr.
E.D. Ky. 1993).
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The IRS had filed tax liens
against the debtors’ property in 1992 and the debtors filed
for Chapter 7 in 1993. The debtors sought to avoid the tax
liens against property listed in I.R.C. § 6323, using the
trustee’s avoidance powers, under 11 U.S.C. § 545(2), as a
good faith purchaser. The court held that a trustee has the
power to avoid tax liens against such property but that the
debtors do not have the power to avoid such liens; therefore,
the debtors had no standing to bring the avoidance action. In
re Robinson, 166 B.R. 812 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1994).
CLAIMS. The IRS failed to file a claim in the case until
more than one year after the bar date for claims. The IRS
had been sent timely and sufficient notice of the bankruptcy
case and provided no explanation for the delay in filing. The
court held that the untimely filed claims would not be
allowed in the case. Some of the IRS claims were secured
by tax liens and the trustee sought to avoid those liens as not
valid against the proceeds from the sale of the debtor’s
property under I.R.C. § 6323 and 11 U.S.C. § 545. The
court held that the liens could not be avoided because there
was sufficient other property to secure the liens. In re
Benny’s Leasing, Inc., 166 B.R. 823 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1993).
The debtor filed a Chapter 7 case and listed federal
employment tax claims. Notice of the case and the bar date
for filing claims was sent to the IRS but not the U.S.
Attorney’s office. The IRS failed to file a claim until after
the claims bar date and the trustee sought to disallow the
claims as untimely filed. The IRS argued that the notice was
defective because notice was not sent to the U.S. Attorney’s
office and that an extension of the time to file the claim
should be allowed because the debtor had not filed a return
as to the taxes involved. The court held that where a claim
involved only taxes, the U.S. Attorney’s office need not
receive a notice and that the debtor’s listing of the
employment tax claim on its bankruptcy schedules was
sufficient notice to the IRS of the claim.  In addition, the
court held that an extension could be granted only if applied
for before the claims bar date. In re Larry Merritt Co., 166
B.R. 875 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1993).
DISCHARGE. When the debtor filed the Chapter 11
petition, the IRS was in the process of auditing the debtor’s
tax returns. The debtor did not list any tax claims and the
IRS did not file any tax claims in the bankruptcy case. The
debtor’s plan was confirmed without objection but did not
contain any provision for payment of taxes. After the plan
was confirmed, the IRS issued a notice of deficiency for
four taxable years and penalties for substantial
underpayment of taxes, all of which would have been
nondischargeable if filed in the bankruptcy case. The debtor
argued that the plan confirmation discharged all debts,
including the taxes, or that the tax claims were barred by res
judicata of the plan confirmation or laches. The court held
that nondischargeable tax claims are not affected by a plan
confirmation, the plan confirmation was not res judicata as
to nondischargeable taxes, and the doctrine of laches cannot
be asserted against the IRS where the IRS has assessed the
taxes within the statute of limitations for assessments.
Matter of Fein, 22 F.3d 631 (5th Cir. 1994).
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The debtor claimed that the IRS claim for 1981 taxes
was dischargeable. The IRS asserted that the taxes were
nondischargeable because no tax return was filed. The IRS
had prepared a substitute return and filed a claim in the case
based on the substitute return. The debtor claimed to have
filed the 1981 return by regular mail but did not produce any
other evidence of payment of the taxes or filing of the
return. The court held that the taxes were nondischargeable
for failure to file a timely return. In re Brown, 166 B.R.
249 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1994).
LIQUIDATING TRUSTS. The IRS has issued revised
procedures for issuance of letter rulings determining
whether an entity created by a Chapter 11 plan is a
liquidating trust for purposes of Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4.
Rev. Proc. 94-45, I.R.B. 1994-28, 124, modifying, Rev.




BRUCELLOSIS . The APHIS has adopted as final
regulations changing Texas from Class B to Class A for
purposes of interstate movement of cattle. 59 Fed. Reg.
36024 (July 15, 1994).
PESTICIDES- ALM § 2.04.* The plaintiff’s residence
was treated for termites by one defendant with pesticides
manufactured by the other defendants. The plaintiff suffered
from cancer of the lungs and sued the defendants for the
injury based on negligence in marketing and applying the
pesticides, failure to properly test the pesticide and failure to
warn about the dangers of use of the pesticdes. The plaintiff
also filed actions for breach of implied warranty and strict
liability for marketing and applying a dangerous and
defective product. The defendant argued that the failure to
warn action was pre-empted by FIFRA. The court held that
the negligence action for failure to warn was pre-empted by
FIFRA but that the negligence actions for failure to properly
test the product were not pre-empted. The court refused to
dismiss the other claims because insufficient record was
available to determine if the plaintiff’s actions were based
on information on the pesticides’ labels. Bingham v.




DISCLAIMERS- ALM § 5.02[6].* The decedent’s
spouse died in August 1990 and the decedent died in
January 1991. The decedents owned real property as tenants
by the entirety and mutual funds and bank accounts as joint
tenants. Within nine months after the death of the
predeceased spouse, the decedent’s personal representative
filed a disclaimer of the decedent’s interest in the
predeceased spouse’s property bequeathed to the spouse.
The IRS ruled that the disclaimer was qualified as to the
bank account and mutual fund to the extent of the
predeceased spouse’s contribution to the accounts because
no withdrawals had been made by either owner. The IRS
also ruled that because neither of the tenants by the entirety
owners could unilaterally partition the property, the
decedent’s interest in the real property was created when the
property was purchased; therefore, the disclaimer was not
qualified because it was not filed within nine months after
the decedent’s tenancy by the entireties interest was created.
Ltr. Rul. 9427003, March 30, 1994.
The decedent’s will bequeathed property in trust to the
surviving spouse with remainders in trust to the decedent’s
surviving children. The surviving spouse disclaimed any
interest in the trust property but did not disclaim any
intestate share in the decedent’s estate. The decedent’s
children and the guardians of the grandchildren disclaimed
their remainder interests in the trust. The disclaimers were
all made to decrease state inheritance taxes. The disclaimed
interests passed by intestacy to the surviving spouse. The
surviving spouse also established a trust which would be
funded at the surviving spouse’s death and would be similar
to the remainder trust interests established by the decedent’s
will. The IRS ruled that the disclaimers were effective for
estate tax purposes and that the reduction in state inheritance
tax and the new testamentary trusts were not consideration
received for the disclaimers. Ltr. Rul. 9427030, April 12,
1994.
INSTALLMENT PAYMENT OF ESTATE TAX-
ALM § 5.05[1].* The decedents died in 1981 and 1987 and
their estates elected to pay the federal estate tax in
installments under I.R.C. § 6166. The estates included stock
in a corporation in which a portion of the stock was held in
escrow as security for the estate tax liens. The heirs used a
reverse triangular merger to form a holding company which
would acquire the original corporation stock and to form a
new subsidiary. The reorganization would qualify under
I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A). The IRS ruled that, although a
Section 368(a)(1)(A) reorganization would normally cause
acceleration of payment of estate tax, in this case the
reorganization would not cause acceleration of the payments
because the reorganization was merely a change in the form
of doing business and that all other aspects of ownership
and management remained the same. Ltr.Rul. 9427029,
April 12, 1994.
SPECIAL USE VALUATION- ALM § 5.03[2].* The
decedent’s estate included irrigated farmland for which the
estate made the special use valuation election. In calculating
the special use valuation, the estate excluded the portion of
the gross rental equal to the amount of irrigation
assessments. The practice in the area was to pass the
irrigation assessments on to the tenants. The estate argued
that (1) the passed through irrigation assessments were not
part of the annual gross cash rent for the land or (2) that the
irrigation assessments should be considered as tax
deductible under I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(7)(A)(i) as local real
estate taxes. The court held that the irrigation assessments
were not deductible from the rent because the statute
referred to gross cash rent which included all rent received
without reduction for any of the landlord’s costs of renting
the land except the deductions expressly provided in the
statute. The court held that the irrigation assessments were
not deductible as local real property taxes, as defined by
Treas. Reg. § 20.2032A-4(c), because the assessments
related to a benefit, irrigation, which increased the value of
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the land. Est. of Klosterman v. Comm’r, 94-2 U.S. Tax




ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX. The taxpayer had
been employed as a researcher and product developer. The
taxpayer’s employment contract provided that the taxpayer
would retain all patent rights to products developed by the
taxpayer, with the company having exclusive licensing
rights to the products. The company paid the taxpayer a
royalty under the licensing agreements. The company
continued to pay the royalties after the taxpayer ceased
employment with the company. The taxpayer argued that
the royalty income was not income from a trade or business
and was included in qualified investment income for
purposes of calculating the alternative minimum tax (AMT)
allowance for deductible qualified interest, I.R.C. §
55(e)(1)(E). The court held that the taxpayer was not in the
trade or business of inventing; therefore, the royalty
payments were investment income for purposes of AMT. In
re Owen, 166 B.R. 960 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1993).
BAD DEBT DEDUCTION- ALM § 4.03[7].* The
taxpayer was an accountant who loaned money to a client
for use in the client’s business and personal expenses. The
court held that the taxpayer could not deduct the unpaid
portion of the loan because the taxpayer could not have
expected repayment given the taxpayer’s knowledge of the
client’s finances at the time the loan was made. The
taxpayer was also liable for the substantial underpayment
penalty for claiming the bad debt deduction, because the
taxpayer failed to show any substantial authority for the bad
debt deduction and failed to disclose information about the
deduction on the taxpayer’s return. Mayhew v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1994-310.
C CORPORATIONS- ALM § 7.02.*
BUSINESS DEDUCTIONS. In completing a
redemption of the corporate taxpayer's stock from an ESOP,
the corporation borrowed the funds used to purchase the
stock. The corporation claimed the loan fees and expenses
as business deductions. The District Court held that under
I.R.C. § 162(k), the fees and expenses were not deductible
because they were incurred as part of a stock redemption.
The appellate court reversed, holding that the purpose of the
loan proceeds was irrelevant for purposes of deductibility
and that the “origin of the claim,” i.e. a loan, was the proper
test for deductibility.  In re Kroy (Europe) Ltd., Kroy,
Inc., 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,316 (9th Cir. 1994),
rev’g, 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,611 (D. Ariz. 1992),
rev'g, 92-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,146 (Bankr. D.
Ariz. 1992).
CONSTRUCTIVE DIVIDENDS. The taxpayer was the
sole shareholder of a corporation which operated several
technical schools. The corporation made several advances to
the taxpayer who used the proceeds to make several real
estate investments, including additional technical schools.
The advances were treated on the corporation’s books as
loans with interest charged and set maturity dates. The
taxpayer was able to repay several of the advances but
financial difficulties caused several of the loans to remain
unpaid when the taxpayer filed for bankruptcy. Although the
court noted that the taxpayer’s control of the corporation
favored treating the proceeds as constructive dividends, the
court held that the advances were bona fide loans which
were not included in the taxpayer’s taxable income. In re
Fischer, 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,322 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 1994).
CASUALTY LOSSES- ALM § 4.05.*  The taxpayers
owned four contiguous parcels of land, one of which
contained the taxpayers’ residence. A fire destroyed the
residence and the trees and shrubs on all four parcels. The
taxpayers’ basis on each of the parcels was not exactly
determined but the basis for all of the property was at least
equal to the loss determined by comparison of the fair
market values before and after the fire; therefore, the
taxpayers were eligible for a casualty loss deduction for the
loss of value on all four parcels. Beams v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1994-301.
  DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS- ALM § 4.02[15].*
A partnership was composed of several limited partnerships
(LPs) and owned rental real property. The property was
managed by a company hired by the partnership which
provided services for the business tenants. The partnership
had borrowed money from a bank  and had filed for Chapter
11 bankruptcy to restructure the debt. The partnership
expected the restructuring to result in discharge of
indebtedness income. The IRS ruled that the operation of
the rental real estate was a trade or business; therefore, the
indebtedness qualified as real property business
indebtedness for purposes of I.R.C. § 108(c)(3) and the
partnership could decrease its basis in property by the
amount of discharged indebtedness income if each of the
LPs elected to have I.R.C. § 108(c) apply. The IRS also
ruled that the LPs’ interests in the partnership would qualify
as depreciable property to the extent of the partnership’s
interest in depreciable property. Ltr. Rul. 9426006,
9426007, 9426008, 9426009, 94260010, 94260011, March
25, 1994.
ELECTRONIC DEPOSITS. The IRS has provided
guidance for taxpayers who were required to make a
electronic funds transfer (EFT) which was not timely
received by the IRS through no fault of the taxpayer. The
ruling provides the requirements for establishing reasonable
cause for the untimeliness of the EFT in order to abate the
failure to deposit penalty. Generally, the taxpayer may show
reasonable cause through the taxpayer’s books and records
or the records of the financial institution through which the
EFT was made. Rev. Rul. 94-46, I.R.B. 1994-29.
HEDGES-ALM § 4.02[6].* The temporary and
proposed regulations involving hedges, discussed in Neil
Harl’s article in 4 Agric. L. Digest, p. 165, have been
adopted as final. The regulations provide that  a transaction
that is not entered into primiarily to reduce risk is not a
hedge. Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-2(c)(1). Thus, it is not a hedge
to sell a commodity produced by the taxpayer and then to
buy the commodity in the futures market. However, the IRS
comments to the regulations state that a hedge occurs when
a taxpayer engages in a store-on-the board transaction as a
hedge of an expected agricultural price support payment.
The final regulations add a special rule for noninventory
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supplies. If a taxpayer sells only a negligible amount of a
noninventory supply, the noninventory supply is treated as
ordinary property for the purposes of determining whether a
hedge of the purchase of that noninventory supply is a
hedging transaction. Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-2(c)(5). 59 Fed.
Reg. 36355, 36360 (July 18, 1994).
HOBBY LOSSES- ALM § 4.05[1].* The taxpayer
operated a horse buying, selling, training and breeding
operation with a record of 13 years of losses. The court held
that the business was not operated with the intent to make a
profit because the business was not operated in a business
like manner. The taxpayer maintained no books or records
and did not maintain a separate checking account for the
business. The court noted that although the losses were
covered by the taxpayer’s personal assets, the taxpayer
could no longer expect the business to become profitable
after 13 years of losses. Kaufman v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1994-305.
The taxpayer was an attorney who owned a corporation
in the business of buying and selling polo horses. The
taxpayer included the legal fees from clients met through the
polo horse business in the income from the polo horse
business for the purpose of determining the profitability of
the polo horse business. The court held that the legal fees
were not includible in the income of the polo horse business
because the polo horse business was not entered into for the
purpose of obtaining legal clients. The court also held that
the polo horse business was not entered into with the intent
to make a profit because the taxpayer did not make a
business plan or formulate any financial projections for the
business. Mendoza v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-314.
The taxpayers operated a horse boarding business and
kept two of their own horses at the stable. The court allowed
the taxpayers to deduct the related business expenses as to
only one horse because only that horse was necessary as a
demonstration to current and prospective horse boarders that
the stable provided quality care of horses. Ottow v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-319.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY. The taxpayers
formed a limited liability company (LLC) under the North
Dakota Limited Company Act. The IRS ruled that the LLC
would be taxed as a partnership because (1) the company
lacked the corporate characteristic of continuity of life
because, under the LLC Act and the LLC articles of
organization, the consent of the remaining members was
required to continue the company if a member left the
company and (2) the company lacked the corporate
characteristic of free transferability of interests because,
under the LLC Act and articles of organization, a member
cannot transfer a right to participate in the management of
the company without the consent of the other members. Ltr.
Rul. 9425013, March 23, 1994.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
SECOND CLASS OF STOCK. An S corporation had
two shareholders who wanted to make an employee a
shareholder but wanted to limit the employee’s share in the
appreciation of the value of the company. Under the
shareholders’ agreement, all stock had the same rights as to
voting, dividends, income and losses. The agreement also
provided that on the death, permanent disability or
employment termination of a shareholder, the shareholder’s
stock could be purchased by the remaining shareholders.
The redemption price of the employee’s shares was limited
to the per share value less the per share value on the date the
employee purchased the stock plus 80 percent of the price of
the employee’s stock. The IRS ruled that, under Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1361-1(l)(2)(iii)(B), bona fide stock redemption
agreements are disregarded in determining whether shares
of stock confer identical rights; therefore, the employee’s
stock was not a second class of stock. Ltr. Rul. 9425023,
March 25, 1994; Ltr. Rul. 9425027, March 25, 1994.
INSURANCE
EMPLOYEE COVERAGE. The plaintiff was a laborer
on a farm who was injured while repairing some machinery.
The plaintiff and other employees had received over $2000
in wages the year before the accident. The farm owner had a
liability insurance policy which the court interpreted as
excluding  farm employees from coverage if the total
payroll exceeded $2,000. The plaintiff sought coverage
under the policy, arguing that the plaintiff was an eligible
insured under two other policy provisions. The first
provision included domestic employees as insureds. The
court held that a general farm laborer was not a domestic
employee. The other provision included farm employees
“with respect to farm implement” covered by the policy.
The court held that this provision did not apply because the
provision involved coverage only as to accidents involving
third parties and did not cover injuries to the employee. The
dissent argued that the provision excluding employees if the
payroll exceeded $2,000 was ambiguous in that it contained
no words of exclusion but could have been interpreted as
descriptive of the farm owner’s business as part of the
premium calculation; therefore, the plaintiff should have
been covered under the doctrine of reasonable expectations
of the policy owner that all employees were covered
regardless of the payroll amount.  Reinsurance Ass’n v.
Johannessen, 516 N.W.2d 562 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
LANDLORD AND TENANT
CONSTRUCTIVE EVICTION. The plaintiff rented
315 acres of farm land to the defendants under a three year
lease. In the end of the second year a dike on the land broke,
causing some of the land to be unusable. The parties agreed
to a reduced rent for the last year of the lease because of the
flooding. In the fourth year the parties orally agreed to a one
year lease which included the repair of the dike by the
tenant with the rent decreased by the cost of the repairs. The
dike was repaired but the the tenant paid less than the
amount of agreed to rent less the cost of the repairs and the
landlord sued for the balance. The written lease provided
that the tenant agreed to repair all improvements on the
property. The tenant argued that the landlord’s failure to
repair the dike caused a constructive eviction of the flooded
property. The court held that the written lease did not
impose a duty on either party to repair the dike. However,
the court held that the oral lease placed the duty on the
tenant to repair the dike and that because no flooding
occurred after the tenant assumed the duty to repair the dike,
the tenant was not entitled to a reduction in the rent. Coates
v. Jaye, 633 N.E.2d 334 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
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PRODUCTS LIABILITY
CATTLE FEED. The plaintiff was a dairy farmer who
purchased feed supplemented with vitamins A and D from
one of the defendants and manufactured by the other
defendant. The plaintiff’s cows became ill with some dying
and others becoming useless for milk production. The
plaintiff sued for breach of implied and express warranties
and in strict liability. The defendants argued that the
plaintiff failed to show that the feed caused the illness and
death of the cows. The court held that, although the plaintiff
demonstrated that the feed did not have sufficient vitamin A
and D, the plaintiff did not provide sufficient evidence that
the feed caused the death of the cows; therefore, the amount
of damages could not include the value of the lost cows.
However, because the plaintiff did demonstrate that the
cows became ill after changing to the new feed, a new trial
would be allowed on all causes of action. Purina Mills, Inc.
v. Askins, 875 S.W.2d 843 (Ark. 1994).
COMBINE. The plaintiff operated a custom grain
harvesting business and purchased four combines. The
plaintiff experienced loss of tire pressure and other
problems with the drive wheels on the combines, resulting
in extensive down-time and loss of income. The wheels
were manufactured by the defendant and supplied to the
combine manufacturer. The plaintiff sued the wheel
manufacturer for negligence and breach of implied
warranty, seeking damages for lost profits and repair costs.
The court held that under Texas law, economic losses could
not be recovered in a negligence action against a supplier of
parts used to manufacture another product. The court also
held that the plaintiff could not recover economic loss
damages under a claim for breach of implied warranty
against a supplier because the plaintiff had no privity with
the supplier but would only look to the manufacturer of the
finished product for any warranty. Hininger v. Case Corp.,
23 F.3d 124 (5th Cir. 1994).
SEED.  The plaintiff purchased grain sorghum seed
from the defendant. The seed failed to produce a good crop
and the plaintiff claimed that the failure to produce resulted
from the inadequate application of a safener on the seed to
protect it from carryover of herbicides. The plaintiff sued
under theories of negligence, breach of contract, strict
liability, violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices
Act, and breach of implied and express warranties. The
court held that the negligence cause was properly dismissed
because the failure of the defendant to properly perform
tests and label the products involved contractual duties
included in the breach of contract claims. The court also
held that the strict liability claim was properly dismissed
because the only injury was to the grain. The court held that
the dismissal of the breach of express warranty was not
proper as to the seller of the seed because the jury could
have found that the seller represented that the treated seed
would produce better crops than other seeds and that the
plaintiff relied on the seller’s superior knowledge and
advice. The court also held that the dismissal of the breach
of express warranty was not proper as to the producer of the
seed because the jury could have found that the label claim
of 85 percent germination was erroneous. The plaintiff’s
claim for breach of implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose was improperly submitted to the jury
because the plaintiff did not show that the seed was chosen
for a particular purpose, only the general purpose of
growing a commercial grain crop. The jury verdict for
violation of the Texas Act was overturned because of
insufficient evidence that the safener was inadequately
applied. Crosbyton Seed Co. v. Mechura Farms, 875
S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
DEFAULT. The plaintiff purchased a tractor from a
local implement dealer by trading in two tractors and giving
a note for the balance, payable in annual installments. The
note was assigned to the defendant. The plaintiff was late
with the first installment and made only a partial payment of
the second installment which was also late. The parties
agreed to a schedule for the plaintiff’s payment of the
remainder of the installment but one month later, the
defendant repossessed the tractor without notice and gave
the plaintiff one month to redeem the tractor or the tractor
would be sold. The tractor was sold at auction with the
proceeds applied against the note. The plaintiff sued the
defendant for wrongful repossession. The defendant was
granted summary judgment because the trial court held that
the debtor was in default at the time of the repossession and
the note allowed repossession without notice after a default.
The appellate court reversed, holding that the defendant’s
acceptance of the late payments and agreement to a schedule
for making up the late payments was a waiver of the
repossession clause of the note and required notice to the
plaintiff that no more late payments would be accepted
before the repossession clause could be used to make a
repossession without notice. Therefore, summary judgment
was not proper because a factual issue remained as to
whether the defendant’s conduct waived the plaintiff’s
default on the note. Moe v. John Deere Co., 516 N.W.2d
332 (S.D. 1994).
TRESPASS
TIMBER. The defendants were found to have cut
timber on the plaintiff’s land and the issue on appeal was
whether punitive damages should have been awarded. The
court found that (1) the defendants knew they were cutting
trees on the plaintiff’s land, (2) the defendants failed to
practice good logging methods to prevent cutting trees on
another’s property, (3) the defendants knew a fence existed
on the property line but did not locate the fence, (4) the
defendant cut the trees in a way that increased damage to
seedlings, and (5) the defendants failed to maintain a
logging road to prevent excess erosion. The court upheld the
award of punitive damages. Holiday v. Campbell, 873
S.W.2d 839 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994).
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